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ABSTRACT
This article examines the debate over the constitutionalization of
shari’a in post-authoritarian Arab regimes. A shari’a clause would
empower judges to review the validity of legislation on the basis of
Islamic law. Thus, it raises for the first time the potential counterma-
joritarian effect of judicial intervention. This article examines the con-
ceptualist-style approach to the question of Islam and democratic
constitutionalism. Such an approach, which has hitherto dominated
the debate, seeks to show the compatibility of Islam and democracy, or
the lack thereof, on the basis of conceptual analysis of abstract con-
cepts like Islam and democracy. The article maps and evaluates the
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different discursive moves that moderate Islamists, Salafis, and secu-
larists deploy in this debate. Comparing the debates to the U.S. consti-
tutional debates between originalists and living constitutionalists, I
show the unacknowledged methodological similarities between the
opposing camps. I argue that the contestability of the basic concepts
on which the debate is based shows the futility of the conceptualist
debate. Furthermore, ignoring contestability, fleeing to abstraction,
and falling prey to formalism produce bad normative effects that are
detrimental to the debate. Ultimately, I seek to advance a different
kind of conversation: a pragmatic, consequentialist-style analysis that
takes into consideration prudential and normative arguments for or
against the inclusion of shari’a law in the emerging Arab constitu-
tional orders.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Shari’a Clause and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
This article focuses on conceptual debates surrounding the incorpora-
tion of Islamic law (shari’a) into the constitutions of Middle Eastern
countries as “a source,” “a primary source,” or “the primary source” for
legislation against which the validity of ordinary legislation may possibly
be reviewed (what I will call henceforth a “shari’a clause”). The shari’a
clause became a visible feature of the constitutional design of many Arab
and Islamic countries in recent decades. For example, the Egyptian 1971
Constitution designates Islam as the state’s official religion and — as
amended in 1980 and incorporated in the December 2012 Constitution —
states that “the principles of Islamic shari’a are the primary source of
legislation.”1 Likewise, the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 states that “Islam is
the official religion of the state and a basic source of legislation. No law
can be passed that contradicts Islam’s settled rules.”2 Yet, not all Muslim-
majority states have a shari’a clause.3
The Arab Spring requires a reexamination of the scholarship that
addressed the shari’a clause prior to the Arab uprisings. This scholarship
assumed that “popular democracy movements are hard to come by in the
1 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended,
May 22,1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, available at http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Last
Page.aspx?Category_ID=208.
2 Intisar A. Rabb, “We the Jurists”: Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J.
CONST . L. 527, 535 (2008) (quoting Article 2, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-
Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005).
3 The cases in Indonesia and Turkey illustrate this idea. Saiful Mujani & R. William
Liddle, Muslim Indonesia’s Secular Democracy, 49 ASIAN SURV. 575, 575-76 (2009). It
should be noted, though, that shari’a is applied in the Indonesian autonomous
province Aceh. See Policing Morality: Abuses in the Application of Shari’a in Aceh,
Indonesia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/
2010/12/01/policing-morality.
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contemporary Muslim world.”4 That assumption and generalization is no
longer valid. A reexamination is necessary because constitutional drafters
in post-authoritarian Arab states, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, are
facing anew the question of whether to introduce a shari’a clause.5 This
invites the normative question of whether Egyptian, Tunisian, and Libyan
constitution makers should incorporate shari’a in their emerging constitu-
tional arrangements.
It is a matter of debate whether this constitutionalization of sectarian
values is appropriate in plural societies, in which citizens disagree on the
meaning of the good life, and whether it is necessary to legitimate and
stabilize constitutions. Further, it is unclear what “Islamic law” requires,
who will be entrusted with the task of interpreting it, and how one can
reconcile these requirements with liberal individual rights that many
political theorists and legal scholars consider as a precondition for demo-
cratic rule.6 The stakes of this question seem high given the attempt to
constitutionalize shari’a. Surely, shari’a can be incorporated in ordinary
legislation, a declaratory preamble, or a non-justiciable constitutional
clause. Constitutionalization raises the justificatory bar because it seems
more consequential than these other modes of incorporation. Laws that
might be struck down based on shari’a include: a penal code that excludes
corporal punishment, such as amputation in cases of theft or stoning in
cases of adultery; commercial legislation that permits business lenders to
charge interest; legislation that does not require women to wear a veil;
and legislation that does not require non-Muslims to pay a head tax. One
might reject these implications on democratic or constitutional grounds.
However, a growing body of literature argues that shari’a does not
require any of these outcomes.
The focus of academic scholarship has long been on the compatibility
of Islam as a religion with liberal democracy, and the availability of
Islamic interpretations that are consonant with prevalent liberal concep-
tions of rights and democracy. These debates are relevant both to states
with a Muslim minority and to states with a Muslim majority. As for the
former, scholars discuss the ways in which resources within Islamic law
can support basic liberal rights and, thus, allow a scheme of political
4 NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC
DEMOCRACY 19 (2003).
5 See, e.g., Shari’a Should Be ‘Main’ Source of Libya Legislation, Not Subject to
Referendum: NTC, AL ARABIYA, (July 5, 2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/
2012/07/05/224689.html (quoting a statement by a senior official of the Libyan
National Transitional Council which was addressed to the constitutional drafting
committee).
6 On the various meanings of shari’a, see Nathan J. Brown, Shari’a and State in the
Modern Muslim Middle East, 29 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 359, 359 (1997). See
also Clark Benner Lombardi, Note, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in
Egypt: The Constitutionalization of Shari’a in a Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 81, 91-96 (1998).
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cooperation within a predominantly liberal political order.7 In cases
where the majority of citizens are Muslims, the question becomes
whether the laws governing lawmaking can justly and prudently incorpo-
rate religious principles under pluralist conditions (considering not only
internal Islamic divisions and non-Muslim minorities, but also atheists).8
Some Arab-world scholars insist that political regimes should be secular
and that neither shari’a nor any other religious law should be part of the
constitution.9 Seemingly, in accordance with that view, some constitu-
tional regimes in Muslim-majority countries exclude religion from the
public sphere.10
The novelty of the unfolding situation in Egypt and Tunisia compounds
the high-stakes of this question.  The evolving conditions in these new
democracies confront scholars and constitution makers for the first time
with the familiar paradox of constitutional democracies, that is to say, the
tension between constitutionalism and democracy. This tension is poten-
tially at work when judges have the power to strike down laws because
they are inconsistent with constitutional provisions that incorporate
Islamic law. But for that power to be seriously counter-majoritarian,
popularly elected assemblies should enact the laws. Prior to the Arab
Spring, scholars noted the “divorcing of constitutionalism from democ-
racy” despite the long practice of Arab constitution-making.11 Now there
is a chance that constitutionalism and democracy can be combined. This
may be the immediate effect of the Arab Spring.
Egypt enacted the constitutional provision designating shari’a princi-
ples as “a primary source” (and afterwards as “the primary source”) for
legislation (1971 and 1980, respectively) under authoritarian rulers. Sub-
sequently, and before the Arab Spring, Egyptian judges used the shari’a
provision in the Egyptian constitution to review legislation. Yet, under
the dictatorships in which a regime’s legitimacy is not based on credible
processes of majoritarian electoral vote, any talk of tension between
democracy and rights is largely theoretical. It is true that even under dic-
7 See, e.g., ANDREW F. MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: THE SEARCH
FOR AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS (2009); KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE
CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY (2004); Mohammad Fadel, The True, the Good and the
Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law,
21 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5 (2008).
8 See, e.g., Samuli Schielke, Being a Nonbeliever in a Time of Islamic Revival:
Trajectories of Doubt and Certainty in Contemporary Egypt, 44 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST
STUD. 301 (2012); Atheists and Islam: No God, Not Even Allah, ECONOMIST, Nov. 24,
2012, at 67, 67-68.
9 See, e.g., ABDULLAHI AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE:
NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF Shari’a (2008).
10 See, e.g., BRIAN SILVERSTEIN, ISLAM AND MODERNITY IN TURKEY (2011).
11 NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB
BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT xiv (2002).
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tatorships courts can create some space for rights;12 elections, though pre-
dictable, are not entirely insignificant;13 and legislatures play a role in the
political system.14 But the judicial deployment of rights hardly can be
seen as restricting popular choices. The Arab Spring reverses this situa-
tion and promises to realize the potential for this tension. It becomes an
example of the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”: who decides when peo-
ple disagree on the meaning and requirements of constitutional provi-
sions that include abstract religious law?15
B. Overview of the Argument
This article examines the state of the debate on the constitutionaliza-
tion of shari’a. Until now, the debate seems to have been held on highly
abstract and heavily conceptualist terms. Scholars advocate for their pre-
ferred conceptions of democracy and Islam, offer a theory on how these
conceptions relate to each other, and then answer the question of relig-
ion’s role in a legitimate institutional design.16 If Islam is compatible with
democracy, then this may be a reason to support a shari’a clause. If, on
the other hand, they are not compatible, then this may be a reason to
reject a shari’a clause.
In order to evaluate this kind of conceptualist analysis, Part II maps the
debates on the reconcilability of Islam with democracy. I survey the three
leading attempts to address this question: moderate reconcilers, funda-
mentalist Salafis, and liberal secularists. I call the discourse of the first
group “a discourse of unity” because they reconcile Islam and democracy,
whereas I call the last two groups “a discourse of disunity” because they
claim that Islam and democracy are incompatible.
Part III evaluates the differences and similarities between these pri-
mary positions and argues that none of these attempts succeeds in stabi-
lizing the relationship between these concepts given the contestability of
their respective conceptions. Consequently, the debate provides no ade-
quate answer to the propriety of a shari’a clause. None of the leading
theories offers a compelling answer to the legitimacy question (of
“Islamic constitutionalism”) they seek to address. In making this argu-
12 See, e.g., RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
13 See, e.g., Yoram Meital, The Struggle over Political Order in Egypt: The 2005
Elections, 60 MIDDLE EAST J. 257 (2006).
14 See, e.g., ABDO BAAKLINI, GUILAIN DENOEUX, & ROBERT SPRINGBORG,
LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN THE ARAB WORLD: THE RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS (1999).
15 But see Asem Khalil, From Constitutions to Constitutionalism in Arab States:
Beyond Paradox to Opportunity, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 421 (2010) (arguing
that the question is not of a paradox of constitutionalism as much of limiting state
power).
16 See scholarship mapped below in Part II.
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ment, I analogize the debate under discussion to long-held U.S. debates
on constitutional interpretation in order to show the similarities between
seemingly opposed positions. The debate is not merely futile, however. I
highlight the bad consequences of ignoring contestability, fleeing to
abstraction, and falling prey to formalism.
Therefore, instead of a conceptualist-style analysis, this article seeks to
advance a different kind of conversation that is based on a situated and
consequentialist-style analysis. The distinction between these two kinds of
analyses suggests that conceptualism is overly concerned with determin-
ing the debate by analyzing abstract concepts, but it does not suggest that
conceptualism is indifferent to consequences. By contrast, the consequen-
tialist-like analysis expresses skepticism about the availability of a priori
solutions to value conflicts and focuses instead on the consequences of
alternative institutional structures (but it does not suggest that only con-
sequences matter). These consequences are evaluated in accordance with
normative and prudential considerations. The Conclusion provides a
sketch of how this analysis could look.
In providing this kind of analysis, the article further develops my previ-
ous work’s arguments. In discussing contemporary left-liberal constitu-
tional and political thought, I critiqued the excessive resort to
conceptualism and the resulting pointless debates that do not decide any-
thing of concrete consequence. It is often the case in concrete historical
debates that the core aims and values are well enough understood.
Hence, what is needed is a contextualized, consequentialist-style analysis.
In constitutional and political theory, scholars emphasize the question of
legitimacy as in assigning to constitutions a legitimating function in the
democratic order. Yet, an acceptable conception of legitimacy remains an
elusive quest.17 Consistent with this view, I do not generalize regarding
the legitimacy, or the lack thereof, of Islamic constitutionalism. Such gen-
eralizations are likely to founder when confronted with the diversity in
practice and the futility of conceptual analysis.
II. MAPPING THE DEBATE
By mapping the contemporary debates in the Arab and Muslim world
on Islam’s compatibility with democracy, one can detect a virtual struc-
ture of these debates.18 Such mapping organizes separately held debates
and connects them. There are studies about debates within Islamic schol-
17 See, e.g., Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The
Paradox of Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political Justification, 47
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371 (2012).
18 As such, this is not a historical project. For examples of such a project, see
BABER JOHANSON, CONTINGENCY IN A SACRED LAW: LEGAL AND ETHICAL NORMS
IN THE MUSLIM FIQH (1999); WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
ISLAMIC LAW (2005); KRISTEN STILT, ISLAMIC LAW IN ACTION: AUTHORITY,
DISCRETION, AND EVERYDAY EXPERIENCES IN MAMLUK EGYPT (2011).
33399_bin 31-2 Sheet No. 116 Side A      04/24/2013   16:06:12
33399_bin 31-2 Sheet No. 116 Side A      04/24/2013   16:06:12
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\31-2\BIN208.txt unknown Seq: 7 24-APR-13 13:30
2013] AGAINST CONCEPTUALISM 441
arship and reformers’ efforts,19 about religious political movements,20 and
about constitutional courts.21 These studies rarely highlight the connec-
tions between these three aspects (theocratic, political, and legal) and
rarely map the debate in its entirety to disclose the discursive moves or
methodological commitments of the different protagonists.
An exposition of the primary discursive moves in this debate reveals
two main groups of discourse: a discourse of unity and a discourse of
disunity. The discourse of unity seeks to rationalize away appearances of
contradictions, whereas the discourse of disunity highlights these contra-
dictions. The former seeks conceptual convergence of Islam and democ-
racy in a political system, whereas the latter seeks separation.
A. The Discourse of Unity
The discourse of unity seeks to show the compatibility of Islam with
democracy. This discourse of reconciliation is exemplified in the constitu-
tions of many Islamic and Arab states that incorporate both a shari’a
clause and a declaration of Islam as the official state religion, as well as a
list of liberal and democratic rights like equality and freedom of relig-
ion.22 It is manifested in the discourse and writings of moderate Islamic
movements, like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; legal scholars, like
Abdel Razzaq al-Sanhuri, Tariq el-Bishri, Khaled Abou El Fadl, and
Mohammad Fadel; Egyptian religious scholars, like Yussuf Al-Qardawi;
Tunisian scholar and religious political leader Rashid Al-Ghannoushi;
Egyptian presidential candidate Abdul Mona’im Abu El-Fotouh; and the
jurisprudence of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court.23
These Islamic scholars propagate a “civil state” whose “frame of refer-
ence” or background culture is Islamic, but is neither a theocracy ruled by
19 See, e.g., ELIZABETH SUZANNE KASSAB, CONTEMPORARY ARAB THOUGHT:
CULTURAL CRITIQUE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2009).
20 See, e.g., Bruce K. Rutherford, What Do Egypt’s Islamists Want? Moderate Islam
and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism, 60 MIDDLE EAST J. 707 (2006); Kristen Stilt,
“Islam is the Solution”: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, 46
TEX. INT’L L.J. 73 (2011).
21 See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three
Middle Eastern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1819 (2004).
22 See, e.g., Rabb, supra note 2, at 535-36 (discussing the 2005 Iraqi Constitution). R
23 See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 20 (discussing some of these and other scholars R
as well as the Muslim Brotherhood); Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do
Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari’a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt’s
Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 379 (2006); MUHAMMAD ABED AL-JABRI, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND LAW IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT (2009); NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND
RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE (2008); Mohammad H. Fadel, Public Reason as a
Strategy for Principled Reconciliation: The Case of Islamic Law and International
Human Rights, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008).
33399_bin 31-2 Sheet No. 116 Side B      04/24/2013   16:06:12
33399_bin 31-2 Sheet No. 116 Side B      04/24/2013   16:06:12
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\31-2\BIN208.txt unknown Seq: 8 24-APR-13 13:30
442 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31:435
clergy nor a secular state.24 For them, secularism, unlike modernity, “is
incompatible with Islamic values.”25 They justify the rule of law and con-
straints on state power to prevent tyranny, call for accountability of
freely-elected leaders, advocate for an independent judiciary, and support
a multi-party political system as well as networks of civic organizations.
Although shari’a constrains democracy, these constraints do not exclude
women from running for public office, nor are they interpreted to man-
date the violation of rights of non-Muslim minorities.26 Indeed, unity
scholars reject interpretations of religious texts that subordinate
women.27 They also emphasize tolerance in Islam and defend minority
rights.28
These scholars reconcile Islam and liberal rights in two primary ways:
discursive universalization and historicism. To achieve universalization,
they highlight the underlying, abstract principles of both Islam and
democracy; they abstract both concepts from their concrete historical
materializations. Abou El Fadl, for instance, writes:
[T]he Qur’an itself does not specify a particular form of government.
But it does identify a set of social and political values that are central to a
Muslim polity. Three values are of particular importance: pursuing justice
through social cooperation and mutual assistance; establishing a
nonautocratic, consultative method of governance; and institutionalizing
mercy and compassion in social interactions. So, all else being equal,
Muslims today ought to endorse the form of government that is most
effective in helping them promote these values.29
The main difficulty facing scholars is the seeming tension between the
rule of God’s commands (divine sovereignty) and the rule of the people
(popular sovereignty). Reconcilers, however, resolve this tension by
interpreting popular sovereignty as popular power under constitutional
constraints on the one hand, and by interpreting divine sovereignty as
24 See Al-Qardawi Yujeeb ‘Ala As’aelat al-Mushahedeen [Qaradawi Answers the
Viewers Questions], AL-JAZEERA (Apr. 8, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/
pages/a6daa716-5111-4508-8ad4-087715373ae2 (Qatar) (interview with Yusuf Al-
Qardawi and transcript); see also Rutherford, supra note 20, at 730. R
25 Rachid Al-Ghannouchi, Secularism in the Arab Maghrib, in ISLAM AND
SECULARISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 97, 106 (Azzam Tamimi & John L. Esposito eds.,
2000).
26 Rutheford, supra note 20, at 712-19. These attempts at reconciliation are by no R
means limited to Sunni scholars. Iranian Shiite scholars such as Abdolkarim Soroush
made similar arguments. See Rabb, supra note 2, at 559-61 (summarizing his views). R
27 See, e.g., KHALED ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD’S NAME: ISLAMIC LAW,
AUTHORITY, AND WOMEN x (2001) (criticizing the “misuse and misrepresentations”
of the Islamic tradition).
28 See generally KHALED ABOU EL FADL ET AL., THE PLACE OF TOLERANCE IN
ISLAM (2002); RACHEL M. SCOTT, THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL ISLAM: NON-
MUSLIMS AND THE EGYPTIAN STATE (2010).
29 ABOU EL FADL, supra note 7, at 5 (references to the Qur’an omitted). R
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including popular sovereignty on the other. For them, it is the people who
are entrusted with interpreting and applying God’s commands that tend
to be vague and indeterminate.30
The second move is historicism.31 Scholars focus on the context of old
religious texts, either to make them relevant to modern day questions or
to limit the application of those aspects that are not easily reconcilable
with democracy or rights, as in rejecting the second class status of non-
Muslims.  Rashid Al-Ghannoushi states, for example, that the concept of
“ahl al-dhimma” (according to which non-Muslims under Islamic rule
should pay a head tax) is a historical construct that should be
superseded.32
Reconcilers are not monolithic and reach different conclusions on a
number of issues. Some of them are more liberal than others. Al-Qardawi
argues that the differentiation in inheritance between men and women
(specifically, that a man gets twice the woman’s share),33 and the require-
ment that women should wear a headscarf, are clearly and unquestiona-
bly mandated by shari’a.34 Yet, other scholars like Fatima Mernissi claim
that the veil is not required because the Qur’anic verse should be contex-
tualized according to the particular time of, and reasons for, its delivery.35
Mernissi also argues that the Prophet was actually egalitarian with
respect to women, but his tradition was distorted by his successors.
Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri argues that one should reflect first on the gen-
eral principles of shari’a, and these posit an initial condition of equality
30 FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 57-60; ABOU EL FADL, supra note 7, at 5-10. R
31 Mohammad Fadel, Is Historicism a Viable Strategy for Islamic Law Reform? The
Case of ‘Never Shall a Folk Prosper Who Have Appointed a Woman to Rule Them’, 18
ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 131 (2011) (distinguishing between two historicizing methods:
one based on a progressive interpretation of history and the other based on textual
interpretation; claiming that the latter is favorable as it has better chances to gain
acceptance amongst Muslims); Anver M. Emon, The Limits of Constitutionalism in
the Muslim World: History and Identity in Islamic Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? 258 (Sujit Choudhry
ed., 2008) (calling for a historicist approach towards shari’a and rejecting the
ahistorical application of pre-modern shari’a with respect to non-Muslim minorities).
32 For some of Al-Ghannoushi’s interventions, see Min Ro’aa al-Shiekh Rashid al-
Ghannoushi [Visions of Sheikh Rashid al-Ghannouchi], ARABS FOR DEMOCRACY
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://arabsfordemocracy.org/democracy/pages/view/pageId/1023
(Egypt).
33 See Al-Shari’ah. . Ma’anaha wa Mabnaha [Shari’a . . . its meaning and structure],
ALJAZEERA (Jan. 8, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/pages/79cadc56-6db9-4f
28-ad6b-6524b667db5c (Qatar).
34 Taghteyat Sha’ar al-Mar’ah [Covering the woman’s hair], QARADAWI.NET (Sept.
26, 2012), http://www.qaradawi.net/component/content/article/5835.html (Qatar).
35 FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST
INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN ISLAM (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., 1991).
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between men and women.36 In the limited areas where there is a differen-
tiation, one needs to consider the context and the rationale for this differ-
entiation, then ask whether this context has changed in ways that
invalidate the rationale, and finally, therefore, return to the initial status
of equality. The goal of the inheritance arrangements, for instance, was to
avoid disrupting the economic balance between the tribes by wealth
acquisition through marriage, especially given polygamy and the resulting
frictions that this disruption may cause.37 The tribe, however, has long
ceased to be the primary unit for social and economic organization in
most of the Arab world.
Political movements have translated these scholarly attempts into polit-
ical programs. Documents released by the highly influential Muslim
Brotherhood in the 2005 electoral campaign echo many of these posi-
tions. They call for a democratic system of government with free and fair
elections and a strong parliament, reject theocratic or priestly rule, seek
to constrain presidential power, advocate for repealing Egyptian emer-
gency law, and support judicial independence along with the abolition of
exceptional courts and limiting the power of military courts.38
Finally, the jurisprudence of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional
Court (the “SCC”) represents such reconciliation. Lombardi and Brown
argue that the SCC “ha[s] proposed a theory of Islamic legal interpreta-
tion that marries the national commitment to Islamic law with the Court’s
commitment to liberal constitutionalism.”39 It thus supposedly demon-
strates that a “progressive court can . . . ‘Islamize’ state law in a way that
is consistent with democracy, international human rights and economic
liberalism.”40 The Court’s methodology, however, may not be as devel-
oped as Lombardi and Brown suggest, as the SCC never really presented
such an elaborate method. In fact, many of the rulings were justified on
procedural grounds (functionally avoidance techniques) by claiming that
Article 2 cannot be applied retroactively to legislative acts that predated
its enactment. The Court’s rulings, however, effectively made the shari’a
clause vacuous by limiting its application. For instance, the SCC rejected
the claim that the Egyptian penal code is incompatible with Article 2,
given that the penal code refrains from applying an amputation punish-
ment in cases of theft, which is part of the hudud code of corporal punish-
ments, a punishment that continues to be practiced in Saudi Arabia
today.41 The SCC also rejected a petition arguing that the penal code’s
36 MUHAMMAD ABED AL-JABRI, AL-DIMOKRATIYYA WA HOQOOQ AL-INSAN
[DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 180-81 (1994) (Lebanon).
37 Id. at 182-85.
38 Rutherford, supra note 20, at 720-26. R
39 Lombardi & Brown, supra note 23, at 385. R
40 Id. at 386.
41 Case no. 32/1989/Supreme Constitutional Court, (Egypt), available at  http://
hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=3178&searchWords=.
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provision on adultery should be declared unconstitutional because it
merely stipulates incarceration rather than corporal punishment.42 Simi-
larly, the SCC rejected the attempt to prohibit business lenders from
charging interest, which was legal under the Egyptian Civil Code, despite
the claim that shari’a prohibits usury.43 The SCC also upheld the right of
women to divorce their husbands in personal status legislation,44 and fur-
ther protected property rights and economic liberalization.45
B. The Discourse of Disunity
The discourse of disunity rejects the attempts to reconcile Islam and
democracy and claims that these competing concepts are incompatible.
There are two main opposing groups in this discourse: Salafis and secular-
ists. Both dissolve the tension between Islam and democracy by rejecting
one of these sides and endorsing the other. The Salafis are pro-Islamic
dissolvers, the secularists are pro-democracy dissolvers.
1. Salafism
The Salafis are represented by the Al-Nour party in post-Mubarak
Egypt and Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia.46 Salafism is a loosely used and
ambiguous concept.47 It often refers to a reformist, fundamentalist move-
ment that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century and
“called upon Muslims to return to the practices and beliefs of their ‘pious
ancestors’.”48 Salafism accepted “only the earliest scriptural texts (i.e., the
Qur’an and the hadith [the corpus of the Prophet’s statements]) . . . as
sources of belief and practice.”49 Salafis are purists who “advocated
sweeping away what they viewed as the divisiveness of the four schools of
Sunni law and reviving ijtihad to allow believers to directly consult the
foundational texts of the faith as guides for their own lives.”50
42 Case no. 34/1990/Supreme Constitutional Court, (Egypt), available at http://
hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=3187&searchWords=.
43 Case no. 20/1985/Supreme Constitutional Court, (Egypt), available at http://
hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=330&searchWords=.
44 Hirschl, supra note 21, at 1829. R
45 Lombardi & Brown, supra note 23, at 416-17, 425. R
46 See, e.g., FRANK E. VOGUL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF
SAUDI ARABIA (2000).
47 Herni Lauziere, The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism From the
Perspective of Conceptual History, 42 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 369 (2010).
48 Scott S. Reese, Salafi Transformations: Aden and the Changing Voices of
Religious Reform in Interwar Indian Ocean, 44 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 71, 72
(2012).
49 Id.
50 Id. The word “ijtihad” often refers to the human process of understanding divine
commands (that is to say, what shari’a requires from believers) through scriptural
exegesis (the Qur’an), the prophet’s statements (“hadith”), analogical reasoning
(“qiyas”), and consensus amongst the scholars (“ijma’”). See generally Wael B.
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Salafis are not monolithic.51 They are self-proclaimed scriptural literal-
ists who reject later-day innovations by returning to the original texts and
criticizing forms of popular spirituality (shrine visits, saint veneration, and
Sufism) as “erroneous doctrinal practices.”52 Yet, some Salafis accommo-
date some of these practices while focusing on “individual moral con-
duct”53 as in “ignorance, superstition, and personal weakness,”54 or
“gambling and drinking.”55 In addition, while some Salafis are quietists
who interpret major Islamic concepts in apolitical, social ways and with-
draw from political activity, others are radicals who apply these concepts
to the political realm.56 For the most part, Salafis refrained from political
activity prior to the Arab Spring. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring
they formed parties and participated in the electoral process.57 Yet,
Salafis reject the phrase “the civic state” because for them it implies an
unacceptable separation between religion and the state.58 They reject
Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, 16 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 3 (1984).
Scholars use these four methods to reach what they consider as the correct
interpretations and applications of the text. Id. The Islamic world is divided into
Sunnis and Shiites. Id. This divide originates in a political dispute over who is entitled
to govern the Islamic community after the Prophet’s passing away. Id. Internally these
two camps are divided into different schools (“madhab”) that differ in their
interpretations and application of the text. Id. Most famously the four classical
jurisprudential schools are the Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi’i. Id. It is often
asserted that ijtihad was closed in the ninth century and no new schools beyond these
four were established. Id. That, however, is a misconception because it overlooks the
myriad of ways in which scholars have innovated and revised the tradition. Id.
51 Reese, supra note 48, at 77. R
52 Id. at 84.
53 Id. at 83.
54 Id. at 84.
55 Id. at 86.
56 Joas Wagemakers, The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and
Radical Wahhabi Contestations of al-Wala Wa-L-Bara, 44 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST
STUD. 93 (2012).
57 For a discussion of Salafism in Egypt, see Ammar Ahmad Fayed, Al-Salafiyyon
fi Misr: Min Shar’aeyyat al-Fatwa ila Shar’aeyyat al-Intikhab [Salafists in Egypt: From
the Legitimacy of the Fatwa to Electoral Legitimacy], ALJAZEERA (July 16, 2012, 1:34
PM) http://studies.aljazeera.net/reports/2012/07/201271103413876925.htm  (Qatar).
For a discussion of Salafism in Tunisia, see Fabio Merone & Francesco Cavatorta, The
Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia, JADALIYYA (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.jadaliyya.
com/pages/index/6934/the-emergence-of-salafism-in-tunisia.
58 Karima Abd al-Ghani, D. Yasser Burhami Na’aeb Ra’aees Al-Da’awah al-
Salafiyya: Nakhtalef ma’aa al-Ikhwan Hawla al-Na’aeb al-Qobti [Dr. Yasser Burhami
Vice President of the Salafi Call: We Disagree with the Brotherhood on the Coptic
Parliament Member], AL-AHRAM (Egypt), July 5, 2012, http://www.ahram.org.eg/Al-
Mashhad-Al-Syiassy/News/158838.aspx (distinguishing between two meanings of
“civic state” – a civilian state (in the sense that its rulers are not military officers), and
a non-religious state. Burhami accepts the former but not the latter).
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democracy as a form of government because they see it as synonymous
with secularism, which they equate with immorality and the lack of
Islamic identity, or with bad national or international policies.59 For many
Salafis, democracy is heresy.60
Salafis and moderate reconcilers differ in questions like riba (unjust
enrichment), hudud (corporal punishment), and electing women or Chris-
tians for public office. While Salafis prohibit economic actors from charg-
ing interest, reconcilers often allow business lenders to charge interest.61
Salafis insist on corporal punishment, whereas reconcilers like Al-
Qardawi reject “the reductionism” of shari’a into mere rules on punish-
ment, and lament the Salafi preoccupation with exceptions that apply to
delinquents.62 Reconcilers interpret shari’a to include noble principles
like social justice and rights, and aim to reform the individual, the family,
and society.63 Salafis argue that a non-Muslim can be neither a president
nor a parliament member in a state whose official religion is Islam.64
Indeed, in April 2011 they objected to the appointment of a governor for
Egypt’s al-Qana district on the grounds that he was Christian.65
59 Abdel Fattah Madi, Mashayekh al-Salafiyya wal Demokratiyya [Salafi Sheikhs
and Democracy], AL-SHOROUK (Egypt), Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.shorouknews.com/
columns/view.aspx?cdate=17112011&id=8337d400-c6c6-44cc-83a6-c8fc3e682a01.
60 “Democracy is heresy because it contradicts the principle of allegiance that was
used after the death of prophet Mohamed, whereby people choose their caliph once
and then remain loyal to him, said the Salafi Nour Party at a rally in Giza. The party
called the campaign of the liberal Egyptian Bloc a campaign of ‘Zionism’ and
‘Freemasonry.’ ‘We must obliterate the liberalism that was introduced by Sadat and
Mubarak and reinstate the rule of Islam,’ said Shaaban Darwish, a member of the
party’s supreme committee. ‘The liberals have corrupted political life in the last 60
years,’ he added. ‘All they want is to protect their interests with the Americans and
the Arabs.’ ‘When we rule, we’ll bring in a lot of money,’ he said. Party candidate
Adel Azazy said Islamic laws in Saudi Arabia helped reduce the crime rate
substantially.” Democracy is Heresy, says Salafi Nour Party AL-MASRY AL-YOUM
(Egypt), Dec. 8, 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/540666.
61 See, e.g., Mohammad H. Fadel, Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation:
Preliminary Thoughts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 655, 701 (2008) (“[Riba] is a simple price
setting mechanism that by its own terms operates only in emergency or near
emergency situations and loses its relevance once that crisis has passed. . . . Islamic
transactional law must be primarily understood functionally, rather than as an
exercise in fidelity to religiously normative texts.”).
62 Al-Ghani, supra note 58. R
63 See Yusuf Al-Qardawi, Al-Dostoor wa Marje’aiyyat al-Shari’ah [Constitution
and Shari’a] (Feb. 18, 2007), http://www.qaradawi.net/2010-02-23-09-38-15/4/4881-
2011-07-05-13-54-05.html (Qatar).
64 Al-Ghani, supra note 5858. R
65 Tathahurat fi Muhafathat Qana bi S’aeed Misr Ihtijajan ‘ala Ta’ayeen Muhafeth
Masihi [Demonstrations in Qana District in Egypt’s Countryside Protesting the
Appointment of a Christian Governor], MASRAWY (Apr. 19, 2011), www.masrawy.
com/news/mideast/afp/2011/april/19/4596631.aspx (Egypt).
33399_bin 31-2 Sheet No. 119 Side B      04/24/2013   16:06:12
33399_bin 31-2 Sheet No. 119 Side B      04/24/2013   16:06:12
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\31-2\BIN208.txt unknown Seq: 14 24-APR-13 13:30
448 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31:435
2. Secularism
If Salafism is a backward-looking movement, secularism is a forward-
looking movement. While Salafism could only superficially be called a
modernist movement,66 secularism seems to fit closely with moderniza-
tion. Arab thinkers have advocated for secularism since the mid-nine-
teenth century.67 Secularists like George Tarabishi argue that Islamic
history should be reinterpreted as part of a project of modernity.68 Within
this outlook, one can identify secular seeds in Islam, namely the repeated
prioritization of the political over the sacred in the power struggle. While
Salafis gloss over the history of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties and
focus on Islam’s early formative period (the Prophet and the early
caliphs), Tarabishi details the horrors of sectarian warfare and ideological
battles (primarily between Sunnis and Shiites, but also in the immediate
aftermath of the Prophet’s death) that grounded the struggle for power in
a religious cloak.69 Unlike the reconcilers’ emphasis on abstract principles
like toleration, and contrary to their portrayal of secularism as a foreign
implant,70 this reading of history serves as a reminder for the need for
secularism within Islam itself.71 Tarabishi further dismisses the Islamist
deployment of “divine sovereignty” as a contemporary ideological pro-
jection on the religious text or even an example of false consciousness.72
Ultimately, Tarabishi calls for a far-reaching secularization at all levels:
the state (the institutional level), society (a long-term pluralistic pedagog-
ical project), and religion (separating the worldly from the spiritual).73
The jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court echoes some of
these views.74 The Turkish Constitution emphasizes republicanism,
66 See Lauziere, supra note 47, at 385 (“The impression that some progressive R
intellectual entity called Salafism turned into Wahhabism or gave way to a ‘neo-
Salafiyya’ . . . remains as misleading as the conceptual postulates on which it rests. The
reification of early 20th-century Salafism as an intrinsically modernist movement of
reform is a figment of scholarly imagination that cannot withstand historical
scrutiny.”).
67 See NAZIK SABA YARED, SECULARISM AND THE ARAB WORLD (2002).
68 GEORGE TARABISHI, HARTAKAT; ‘AN AL-DIMOKRATIYYA WAL ‘ALMANIYYA
WAL MOMAN’AH AL-’ARABIYYA [HERETICS: ON DEMOCRACY, SECULARISM,
MODERNITY, AND ARAB INTRANSIGENCE] 34-35 (2006) (Arabic).
69 GEORGE TARABISHI, HARTAKAT 2: ‘AN AL-’ALMANIYYA KA ISHKALIYYA
ISLAMIYYA-ISLAMIYYA [HERETICS 2: ON SECULARISM AS AN ISLAMIC-ISLAMIC
PREDICAMENT] 12-89 (2008) (Arabic).
70 See, e.g., Azzam Tamimi, The Origins of Arab Secularism, in ISLAM AND
SECULARISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 25, at 13. R
71 TARABISHI, supra note 68, at 9-11. R
72 TARABISHI, supra note 69, at 35-38. R
73 TARABISHI, supra note 68, at 92-94. R
74 See, e.g., Mehmet Cengiz Uzun, The Protection of Laicism in Turkey and the
Turkish Constitutional Court: The Example of the Prohibition on the Use of the
Islamic Veil in Higher Education, 28 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 383 (2010); Ceren Belge,
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nationalism, secularism, modernism, and liberal democracy.75 The pream-
ble declares that “the principle of secularism” requires that “there shall
be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs
and politics.”76 Article 2 states that “The Republic of Turkey is a demo-
cratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law . . . .”77 Article
4 entrenches this character of the state making it unamendable.78 The
Turkish Constitutional Court has been committed to the “civilizing mis-
sion” of the secular state.79 The Turkish Constitutional Court perceives
secularism as “the opposite of Shari’a,”80 and as a modernizing force aim-
ing to transform Turkish society from a pre-modern umma (community of
Muslim believers) to a modern “nation.”81 In this vein, the Turkish Con-
stitutional Court supported the ban on wearing hijab and struck down
bylaws that permitted the practice in universities.82 It also disqualified
and dissolved political parties that violated the principles of secularism
and democracy.83
III. ASSESSING THE DEBATE
A. The Nature of the Differences
The differences between the main three positions (Salafis calling for an
Islamic state, moderates calling for an Islamic democracy in a civil state,
and secularists calling for a secular state that excludes shari’a from the
constitution) are clear. Yet upon closer examination, these differences are
not as wide as may be initially assumed: both Salafis and moderates call
for shari’a law, but have different conceptions of it. Both moderates and
secularists call for individual rights, but have different conceptions of
rights. Moderates and secularists are also both driven by the will to mod-
ernize, but have different conceptions of modernization: moderates want
to modernize shari’a so it will continue to be relevant to contemporary
conditions, whereas the secularists want to modernize society through
Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and Selective Activism of the
Constitutional Court of Turkey, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 653 (2006).
75 See Tu¨rkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi [The Consitution of the Republic of
Turkey], available at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=210&lang=
1&c=1.
76 Id. at pmbl.
77 Id. at art. 2.
78 Id. at art. 4.
79 Hootan Shambayati & Esen Kirdis, In Pursuit of “Contemporary Civilization”:
Judicial Empowerment in Turkey, 62 POL. RES. Q. 767, 778 (2009).
80 Uzun, supra note 74, at 395. R
81 Id; see also Hirschl, supra note 21, at 1852-53. R
82 Hirschl, supra note 21, at 1849-50. R
83 Id. at 1851-54.
33399_bin 31-2 Sheet No. 120 Side B      04/24/2013   16:06:12
33399_bin 31-2 Sheet No. 120 Side B      04/24/2013   16:06:12
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\31-2\BIN208.txt unknown Seq: 16 24-APR-13 13:30
450 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31:435
secularization (by getting rid of shari’a altogether).84 Salafism and radical
secularism (like that in Turkey) are two sides of the same coin: both agree
that liberal, secular democracy and shari’a are incompatible; both dis-
solve the tension by preferring one side of it; both are preoccupied with
women’s bodies and dress codes, as the debates on female genital mutila-
tion and the veil exemplify. Finally, both views may lead to a similar
effect of “privatizing” belief: Salafis often avoided organized politics and
focused on social activism and religious practice, whereas secularists rele-
gate religion to the private sphere rejecting its intrusion into state politics.
Each position in this debate exhibits internal tensions. Salafis reject
democracy as popular sovereignty, but accept democracy as a
majoritarian process. Indeed, some voices in the post-Mubarak era have
expressed an acceptance of democracy as a system of government so long
as it does not contravene shari’a.85 Thus, they do not reject democracy
tout court; rather they reject a constitutional conception of democracy. In
other words, they reject liberal rights (for example, they exclude women
and Copts from the right to be elected or to hold an office). They reject
secularism and what they perceive as western influences that undermine
Islamic identity.86 Salafis further claim that they limit human discretion
(by rejecting the proliferation of interpreters and calling for “doctrinal
purity”87) through originalism (by exclusively consulting the primary
sources). They end up, however, empowering the interpreters no less than
the moderate religious schools. To the extent that Salafis insist that their
method gives clear-cut, objective solutions to social-normative disagree-
ments,88 their claim contravenes everyday experience and denies the
84 The work of Abdel-Razzaq Al-Sanhuri – who is a reconciler who had a major
influence on many of the legal codes of Arab states – demonstrates the tension
between Islamicity and modernization or western influences. See Amr Shalakany,
Between Identity and Redistribution: Sanhuri, Genealogy and the Will to Islamise, 8
ISLAMIC L. & SOC. 201 (2001).
85 We’ll Allow a Coptic President when Israel Allows a Muslim One: Salafist
Leader, AHRAM ONLINE (Dec. 6, 2011), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/28628.aspx
(statements by Egyptian Salafi leader Yasser Burhami).
86 See Yasser BaAmer, Nawazel al-Siyasa’ fi Mo’atamar lil Salafiyyen of al-Dawha
[‘Necessities of Politics’ in Salafi conference in AL-Duha], ALJAZEERA (May 24, 2012,
2:47 AM), http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/a0eff1aa-cfb8-4403-804d-ada1490ad08a
(Qatar) (reporting a “consensus” on prohibiting women from being elected or holding
an office as contrary to shari’a, and charging secularism with the responsibility for
lack of identity in Arab and Muslim societies given the lack of shari’a
implementation).
87 Reese, supra note 48, at 77. R
88 See, e.g., Olivier Roy, The Transformation of the Arab World, J. DEMOCRACY,
July 2012, at 5, 10 (“The Salafists, like neofundamentalists the world over, are
recasting religion as a code and a set of clear-cut norms disconnected from tradition
and culture.”).
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interpretive, human agency.89 Indeed, although Salafism is a backward-
looking interpretive movement that venerates the past and tradition,
Salafis reinvent this past and this tradition in order to address modern
day issues.90 Consequently, moderate reconcilers often depict Salafi utili-
zation of the Islamic tradition as “highly selective, unsystematic and
opportunistic.”91
Moderate reconcilers insist on both divine sovereignty and popular
sovereignty. In so doing, they are trying to square the circle. They reject
both secularism and Salafism. They follow what Al-Qardawi calls
almanhaj alwasatti (the centrist method).92 But this leaves them vulnera-
ble to criticisms from both extremes: Salafis will argue that the moderate
reconcilers are insufficiently Islamic/religious, and secularists will argue
that the moderate reconcilers are insufficiently liberal.
Indeed, secularists are not simple-majoritarian democrats; they are
constitutionalists who would reject simple-majoritarian democracy as a
ground for the imposition of religious law (hence their position leads to
the paradox of constitutional democracy). In other words, they prioritize
constitutionalism over democracy. This allows reconcilers to argue that
secularists are not really democrats as they ignore popular will. Feldman,
for instance, argues that Turkish-style secularism effectively impedes
democracy by refusing to acknowledge the possibility of reconciliation
between Islam and democracy.93  It should be noted, however, that
reconcilers are also prioritizing constitutionalism over democracy because
they deduce rights from religion.
B. The U.S. Debates Compared
The preceding mapping and discussion indicates that the competing
conceptions of both Islam and democracy are not merely contested but
also contestable. Another way to observe this contestability is by compar-
ing these debates to those in the United States.  Looking beyond the par-
ticular terminology to highlight overlooked connections would
undermine the idiosyncrasies of the debate on Islam and democracy. In
89 Rabb, supra note 2, at 564-65; see also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, The R
Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law and State
Law, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2010) (emphasizing human agency in the development
of Islamic law).
90 Reese, supra note 48, at 86; SAMIRA HAJ, RECONFIGURING ISLAMIC TRADITION: R
REFORM, RATIONALITY AND MODERNITY (2009).
91 ABOU EL FADL, supra note 27, at 175. R
92 Al-Qardawi, supra note 63. R
93 FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 111; see also Asli U¨. Baˆli, The Perils of Judicial R
Independence: Constitutional Transition and the Turkish Example, 52 VA. J. INT’L L.
235 (2012) (arguing that judicial independence and invocations of constitutionalism
have undermined democratization in Turkey and imposed an illiberal conception of
secularism).
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fact, there is a striking similarity between the positions and methodologi-
cal commitments taken in U.S. debates about the role of judicial review
and the U.S. Constitution and the positions taken in these debates on
Islamic law and democracy. The comparison may not be far-fetched, con-
sidering the reverence with which the U.S. Constitution is held.94 Both
the Qur’an and the U.S. Constitution are considered, in their respective
debates, as authoritative and foundational texts. Moreover, Islamists rec-
ognize that it is humans who interpret the scripture to identify—if imper-
fectly, given human limits—the will of God. Both Islamic and U.S.
debates are concerned, among other things, with the best method to
understand the authoritative and foundational text’s requirements.
Broadly conceived, there are two large opposing methodological camps
in the United States that have equivalent counterparts in Islamic debates.
The Salafi methodological choices in particular are analogous to some
versions of U.S. originalism or textualism, like U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice Scalia’s.95 Both advocate for strict, literal, conservative interpreta-
tions and applications of old and self-contained texts.96 Both advocate for
fidelity to these canonical texts.97 While these methodological choices are
taken within different contexts (religious versus secular), they may have
similar religious sources or influences. George Kannar attributes the rise
of originalism in the U.S. to the ideological rise of religious fundamental-
ist revivalism, and traces Justice Scalia’s own interpretive methodological
commitments to his religious background.98 Even more broadly, other
scholars trace modern constitutional ideas to scriptural influences.99
Another similarity is in the method of constructive interpretation that
both the moderate Islamists and Ronald Dworkin or other scholars (sup-
porters of “dynamic interpretation” or “living constitution”) defend.100
Unlike the literalist-formalist opponents, they both recognize the indeter-
minacy of textual provisions. Hence, they both identify overarching and
underlying principles used to interpret a foundational text. Further, they
94 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); Thomas C. Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
95 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (espousing a textualist approach that focuses on
the text rather than overarching principles and emphasizes the original meaning);
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (arguing
that the Constitution has “fixed meaning” and the court should not interpret it in
ways that conform to “current societal values”).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J.
1297, 1309-10 (1990).
99 See, e.g., GRAHAM HAMMIL, THE MOSAIC CONSTITUTION: POLITICAL
THEOLOGY AND IMAGINATION FROM MACHIAVELLI TO MILTON (2012).
100 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
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are both historicists who take the changing context, and not only the text,
into their interpretive account.
Given the methodological similarities, it is not surprising to discover
that accusations in Islamic discussions have equivalent counterparts in
U.S. constitutional theoretical debates. While Salafis are accused of selec-
tive textual interpretation, moderate reconcilers are charged with substi-
tuting the interpreter’s subjective will for original intent and introduce
“judicial intrusion into policy making.” Lombardi and Brown write that
the Egyptian SCC:
has argued that Islamic law is, for constitutional purposes, a source of
general moral principles that must be interpreted anew in every day and
age and must take evolving notions of human welfare into account. The
embrace of this open-ended type of reasoning permits decisions to turn
on subjective conclusions about utility and permits judicial intrusion into
policy-making.101
Arguably, the Egyptian SCC’s deployment of “so broad and vague”
jurisprudential principles gives enormous power to judges that can be
used in non-progressive, non-secular ways.102 Thus, a scholar called upon
the SCC to “limit the interpretive flexibility of judges” by showing “lim-
ited deference to the legislative interpretation of shari’a.”103
This concern with subjective will is a long-running theme in U.S.
debates. Originalists in the United States argue that proponents of con-
structive interpretations are masking the policy preferences behind their
free-wheeling methodological commitments because they are not strictly
confined to the text and use vague interpretative principles. For original-
ists, only originalism secures an impartial approximation of the framers’
intent or the original public meaning at the time of enactment. Likewise,
John Hart Ely—who rejected textualism because some constitutional pro-
visions are open-ended—condemned the attempt to identify enduring,
extra-textual values as illegitimate because external sources (like judge’s
own values, tradition, natural law, or consensus) are indeterminate and
serve for an undemocratic imposition of judicial values.104
These analogies are helpful not only as aids in highlighting the similari-
ties but also because many of the critiques constructive interpretivists
deploy against originalists in the United States, as well as an assessment
of the differences between the competing camps, can be utilized in
Islamic debates.105 Dworkin collapses the distinction between theories
that claim to be text-bound and non-interpretive theories that resort to
101 Lombardi & Brown, supra note 23, at 423. R
102 Lombardi, supra note 6, at 122. R
103 Id.
104 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 43-72 (1980).
105 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia,
Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249 (1997).
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general principles.106 He argues that all theories are interpretive because
they negotiate with the text, and all theories are non-interpretive because
even textualist theories have to justify their text-bound orientation by ref-
erence to extra-textual principles.107 Likewise, Lawrence Solum explains
that the “[t]here is no meaningful distinction” between originalists and
non-originalists.108 On the one hand, “all constitutional theories interpret
the Constitution in accord with the intent of the framers and ratifiers.”109
On the other hand, “originalism is impossible,”110 because the attempt to
understand the framers’ intent is mediated by an interpretive tradition.111
Ultimately, for Dworkin, original intent is not a matter of discovery but
rather of invention.112
In the Islamic context this means that the difference is not between
moderate Islamists who follow a method of “dynamic interpretation” (or
non-interpretivism) and Salafis who are textualists (or interpretivists or
literalists). In other words, it is not between those who go beyond the text
and those who are text-bound.113 That is only a superficial and declared
difference. In fact, the foundational difference between them is the differ-
ence in the conceptions of dynamic interpretation and of textualism. They
are both interpretivists, they both claim that they are faithful to the origi-
nal texts (though they have different conceptions of fidelity),114 and they
are both reading these texts with modern eyes.
If the opponents’ methodological commitments are not that different
after all, then the claim of greater legitimacy (that is to say, more Islamic)
that each camp attaches to its method (and therefore the outcomes it
leads to) vis-a`-vis the other camp is baseless. If the Islamic debates are
structurally similar to the U.S. debates, then the question is not uniquely
religious or Islamic. The question becomes less of interpretive method,
less of religious nature, and less of abstract a priori notions of legitimacy.
106 DWORKIN, supra note 100, at 35-36. R
107 Id.
108 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV.
1599, 1603 (1989).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1610; see also Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (emphasizing
the indeterminacy of the past and the need to reconstruct it based on contemporary
preconceptions).
112 DWORKIN, supra note 100, at 39. R
113 Rabb, supra note 2, at 561 n.98. R
114 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993)
(arguing that “fidelity” to the text does not necessarily mean unchanging
interpretation of the text because interpretation includes meaning and context, and
thus non-originalist, dynamic theories can be no less faithful to the text than
originalism. On the other hand, strict originalism is not faithful to the text if it ignores
the changing context).
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C. Contestability, Abstraction, and Formalism
It follows from the preceding discussion that whether the concepts are
compatible or not will turn on the conception of Islam (or Islamic law)
and the conception of democracy one has in mind. Shari’a, constitutional-
ism, and democracy are all essentially contested concepts.115 As such they
have many competing, but defensible, conceptions and it is not implausi-
ble to suggest either that they are compatible or that they are incompati-
ble. It will be contingent on one’s favored conceptions of the concepts
when approaching this question. These highly abstract concepts have
been embedded in a variety of institutions and practices over an extended
period of time, yet they do not necessarily have determinate meanings.
Such practices are not necessarily uniform or coherent. This is not to say
that the indeterminacy of concepts like Islam is inherent to the concept
itself. Rather, the indeterminacy is a function of the work done by schol-
arly interventions (like the ones mapped here) to offer defensible and
competing conceptions of the concept.116
To assume that the concepts can be shown to be compatible or incom-
patible by virtue of an abstract notion of these competing concepts (as in
the reconciliation move to push shari’a to a higher level of abstraction
where it can meet universal human rights or democracy) merely hides,
rather than resolves, the disagreement about the meaning of the con-
cepts. Thus, it effectively conceals from us the intractability of political
conflict over fundamental questions in society and the polity.117 Abstrac-
tion may hinder a realistic understanding of societal conflicts. Through
abstraction scholars pretend that these questions’ resolution is easier than
it really is.  Abstraction obscures the institutional and material embodi-
ment of ideas. It de-contextualizes them from their specific social, politi-
cal, and historical conditions. It privileges the potential reconciliation
over actual practices that do not necessarily betray such a reconciliation.
However, abstract notions that are disconnected from material applica-
115 W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y
(n.s.) 167 (1956).
116 In other words, I reject the “global indeterminacy” thesis according to which
the concept is essentially or inherently indeterminate (e.g., that it has always been and
will always be contestable) and it never determines the outcome in particular
disputes. The fact that Islam is contestable does not mean that it is globally
indeterminate. Rather, indeterminacy (or determinacy) here refers to the effect that
competing legal and scholarly writings achieve in a particular era with respect to a
particular concept. Moreover, the very fact that it is the concept of Islam, however
contestable, that frames the debate has important exclusion effects from the
standpoint of those whose political/normative identity is defined in opposition to
Islam. See generally, DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS
(2008).
117 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 253 (3d
ed. 2007).
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tions, concrete practices, and real-world institutions are a carte blanche
that can be deployed in different directions. For example, to claim (as
Abou El Fadl does in the above quoted paragraph)118 that Islam embod-
ies values like the pursuit of justice, a consultative form of governance,
mercy, and compassion merely invites disagreement regarding each of
these abstract notions as well as the possibility of conflict between these
values’ interpretations and applications. A Salafi might argue, for exam-
ple, that corporal punishments, like amputation and stoning, are compati-
ble with a retributive notion of justice. In other words, the Salafi merely
has a different conception of justice. The Salafi need not disagree with
this universalization of shari’a, but would disagree with its interpretation
and application. For Sayyed Qutb, for example, Islam endorses freedom,
social justice, and equality, but equality for him is compatible with differ-
entiated treatment of women.119 So the abstract reconciliation loses its
raison d’etre both because it does not avoid disagreement and because it
can lead to an outcome that is incompatible with prevalent notions of
human rights and hence is incompatible with a constitutional conception
of democracy. Or, suppose that the “pursuit of justice” and “mercy and
compassion” lead to conflicting considerations and then different reason-
able persons will differ on the weight of these competing values (while
some may prioritize justice, others would prioritize mercy). Therefore,
this abstract view of Islam can still be internally incoherent. Abstraction
merely rationalizes away tensions and contradictions, and denies para-
doxes (whether by reconciling competing concepts or resolving the con-
tradiction through expelling one of the concepts). It thus quiets any
anxiety that may stem from the simultaneous existence of both concepts
and the variety of ways in which they can conflict or align. Ultimately, it
is an avoidance technique: it allows scholars to flee from facing contradic-
tions and hence from the need to make hard choices and tradeoffs.
Moreover, to assume that these words have a determinate clear, fixed,
or stable meaning and that they dictate certain outcomes through a
deductive method is to fall prey to formalism. Like abstraction, formalism
suggests an apolitical—or objective—and conclusive resolution of con-
flicts through logical reasoning that is not susceptible to the open-ended
character of political and ideological contestation.120 In this vein, Islamic
law is perceived as a gapless and autonomous system whose authoritative
materials can lead to answers through standard operations of logic. This
view ignores human agency (and value choices) of those who interpret
and apply the arrangements and practices associated with these concepts.
118 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. R
119 See LEONARD BINDER, ISLAMIC LIBERALISM: A CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT
IDEOLOGIES 185-86 (1988).
120 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 496-
503 (1988); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT 1-2 (1983).
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Hence it misrepresents the practice of Islamic law. The Salafis are not the
only ones committing the logical fallacy of formalism. The moderate
reconcilers commit the same mistake when they pretend that their own
resolutions or interpretations are correct whereas the Salafi interpreta-
tions are mistaken.
Similarly, to assume that the competing concepts are necessarily
incompatible — as in the secularist position — is to fall prey to essential-
ism by presenting one of the competing concepts (like Islam in general or
shari’a in particular) as having an immutable essence irrespective of
changing times, political developments, and social conceptions. Such
essentialism would ignore the efforts of so many reformers in Islamic law
(like the ones mapped in this article). On the other hand, to assume that
they are necessarily compatible — as in the reconcilers’ position —
presents a reverse essentialism or a romantic view of one of the concepts.
That would ignore the possibility of different practices that can hardly be
reconciled with prevailing conceptions of the other concept. This contest-
ability shows that the question is open-ended and the debate regarding
compatibility is an object of social and political struggle that is not likely
to end any time soon.
The question of compatibility turns out to be contingent on which
views prevail at a certain time and place. Asef Bayat argues that the tex-
tual and conceptual question of compatibility of Islam and democracy is
misconceived.121 Instead, it should be treated historically and descrip-
tively. It is “individuals and groups who hold social power [that] can
assert and homogenize [the sacred injunctions’] truth.”122 For Bayat, the
question is “under what conditions Muslims can make them compati-
ble . . . We, the social agents, determine the inclusive or authoritarian
thrust of religions. . . .”123
It is important to recognize that the Islamic tradition is diverse, contra-
dictory, and constantly evolving. Whether the originalists, the moderates,
or the secularists will prevail, and become the orthodoxy, is a question
that will be determined historically.124 The three main groups make the
same mistake: ignoring the diverse and contradictory character of the tra-
dition. More important, the contestability of the basic concepts under-
mines the utility of the debate because scholars are not engaging with
each other’s arguments when they deploy different conceptions and
hence talk about different things. Through definitional fiat, deductive
moves, or selective readings of history scholars evade addressing the
alleged tension between Islam and democracy.
121 ASEF BAYAT, MAKING ISLAM DEMOCRATIC: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE
POST-ISLAMIST TURN 4 (2007).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Haider Ala Hamoudi, Book Review, 26 J. L. & RELIGION 387, 400-01
(2010) (reviewing MARCH, supra note 7) (emphasis original). R
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Islam and democracy are by no means the only contestable concepts in
this debate. Talal Asad argues that the distinction between the “secular”
and the “religious” is not a fixed distinction upon which we can establish
a juridico-political order, because neither of these concepts has a fixed
meaning. Indeed, the “secular” is neither a mere continuation of, nor a
mere opposition to, the “religious.”125 The “secular” cannot be exclu-
sively associated with the prevention of pain, cruelty and suffering
through rationality since some forms of infliction of pain on the body
have taken secular forms and were justified on secular grounds as when
the non-confessional state sends its citizens to war,126 practices torture
under the guise of security,127 or when pain is integrated into the pursuit
of pleasure by consenting hedonistic adults.128 Nor is the religious to be
associated with irrational suffering in which pain is exclusively antitheti-
cal to human agency since pain and agency are not monolithic categories
and some forms of religious pain might be seen as an expression of
agency (by generating a medium for moral choice and action) rather than
its denial.129 Asad also shows that religious worship and practice may be
– no less than secularism – associated with tolerance; and secularism – no
less than the religious – is compatible with intolerance.130 In modern his-
tory, secularism is responsible for wars and violence without recourse to
religious justifications/ rationalizations.131
Indeed, the religious/secular divide is itself contested by participants in
the debate. For instance, Al-Qardawi — the moderate reconciler — con-
tests the claim that secularism is distinguished from religiosity because it
is, arguably unlike the latter, rooted in rationalism and worldliness. For
Al-Qardawi, Islamism is no less rooted in rationalism and worldliness,
but it is a “believing rationalism” and a worldliness that maintains a con-
nection with the otherworldly.132 In practice, the identification of the sec-
ular with the democratic, and of secularization with democratization, is
challenged by the fact that secularism can be oppressive and undemo-
cratic as experienced in the pre-Arab Spring Tunisia. The identification is
also challenged by the fact that the Arab uprisings (those not led by
Islamic movements nor involving religious demands) occurred after
125 TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM,
MODERNITY 25 (2003).
126 See, e.g., Mark E. Brandon, War and the American Constitutional Order, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 11 (Mark
Tushnet ed., 2005).
127 See, e.g., DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY (2009).
128 ASAD, supra note 125, at ch. 3. R
129 Id. at ch. 2.
130 Id. at 7-8, 100.
131 Id. at 11-12.
132 Al-Qardawi, supra note 63; see also Al-Ghannouchi, supra note 25, at 106 R
(noting that if secularism merely meant the authority of reason then it is compatible
with Islam because faith is rooted in “conviction based on reason.”).
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decades of alleged Islamization of Arab societies.133 Presupposing a
dichotomy between the secular and the religious, then, becomes a differ-
ent version of the errors of formalism or essentialism. It ignores
contestability.
Even if the distinction between the religious and secular were clear,
that would not necessarily determine the propriety of a shari’a clause.
Indeed, even religious scholars may be against the introduction of a
shari’a clause based on religious grounds. For instance, An-Na’im, who
rejects secularism, argues that religious law cannot be enforced by a secu-
lar state because such enforcement negates the voluntary basis of relig-
ious belief.134 In addition, non-Muslim religious persons can object to
Islamic religious law. The Coptic Church opposed the Islamization of
Egypt in the early 1970s, and more recently they opposed strengthening
the shari’a clause in post-Mubarak Egypt.135 On the other hand, secular
and non-Muslim scholars like Noah Feldman, and a minority of Egyptian
Copts may support the introduction of a shari’a clause.136 Thus, the objec-
tions to the shari’a clause need not reflect a secular/religious divide
because opposition to the shari’a clause can come from secular Muslims,
religious Muslims, or religious non-Muslims. Yet, the clause can garner
support from religious Muslims, non-religious Muslims, or secular non-
Muslims.
133 Roy, supra note 88, at 7. But see Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Language of the R
Age: Shari’a and Natural Justice in the Egyptian Revolution, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J.
ONLINE 311, 312 (2011), http://www.harvardilj.org/2011/04/online_52_el-fadl/
(claiming that although Islamists have not led the uprisings, shari’a “played an
important role in fueling and engineering the Revolution”).
134 An-Na’im, supra note 89, at 1-2 (mentioning that he is “personally religious” R
and that he “personally reject[s]” secularism “as a life philosophy.”). For An-Na’im
the main conflict is not between Islam and democracy but rather between religious
law and state law. “Islamic Law cannot be enforced as state law and remain Islamic
Law in the sense that Muslims believe it to be religiously binding. Since the
enforcement of Islamic Law through state institutions negates its religious nature, the
outcome will always be secular, not religious. In other words, all state law is secular
. . . .” Id. at 2. “The state and all its institutions are by definition secular and not
religious, regardless of claims to the contrary.” Id. at 7.
135 Paul Sedra, Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities
in Modern Egyptian Politics, 10 ISLAM AND CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM REL. 219, 226 (1999);
Sarah El Deeb, Pope Tawadros II, Egypt’s New Coptic Leader, Opposes Religious
Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2012, 4:16 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/11/06/pope-tawadros-ii-egypt-copt-opposes-religious-constitution_n_2082
480.html.
136 FELDMAN, supra note 4; Egypt’s Constitution: An Endless Debate over R
Religion’s Role, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2012, at 59 (noting that some Copts demand the
application of shari’a on all citizens including non-Muslims to circumvent “the
conservative Coptic Church’s ban on divorce as to accept shari’a simply to enjoy its
divorce-friendly rules”).
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It is formalistic to argue that secularism or religious leaning would
determine a scholar’s position on this issue. In fact, positions on religion
and state are not reducible to theoretical and conceptual debates, but
rather are influenced by a variety of political considerations. The history
of the U.S. Establishment Clause illustrates this point. According to Jef-
fries and Ryan, Protestants initially supported the separationist view with
respect to aid to religious schools given their anti-Catholic sentiments and
in order to maintain their dominant position.137 Later on, after the deseg-
regation of public schools, Protestants became divided on this issue.
Some Protestants (both fundamentalists and evangelicals) deserted the
separationist view and instead supported aid to private schools that were
established to escape racial integration in public schools.138
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a set of arguments for or against a shari’a clause. Abstract,
essentialist, or formalist arguments are unsuccessful on either side of the
debate because they are internally incoherent. The compatibility of Islam
with democracy cannot be resolved on a highly abstract level of debate.
The availability of defensible and competing answers to the question of
Islam’s compatibility with democracy undermines the ability to answer
the question of a shari’a clause through conceptual analysis. Recognizing
contestability is necessary to undermine rigidly essentialist and formalist
accounts. Additionally, the constitutionalization of shari’a is secondary
to, and relatively independent of, the compatibility of Islam with democ-
racy. It is true that a democrat is more likely to accept a shari’a clause if
she finds that Islam is compatible with democracy. In this respect, the
reformers’ efforts to synthesize Islam and democracy increase the accept-
ability of a shari’a clause. Thus, the shari’a clause is riding on the larger
theoretical question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy. Never-
theless, the relationship between these two questions is not unidirec-
tional. That is, even if shari’a and democracy are incompatible in
principle, there might still be normative and prudential reasons for having
a shari’a clause. Alternatively, regardless of the compatibility of shari’a
and democracy, there might be prudential reasons why a shari’a clause
should be excluded from the constitutional design.139
137 John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 282 (2001).
138 Id.
139 The leading Islamist party in Tunisia has realized this. “According to an
Ennahda parliamentarian, the political council made the decision for a number of
reasons. One is that the meaning of shari’a is varied and the council did not want to
leave a vague reference in the preamble up to judicial or public (mis)interpretation.
The question of shari’a is also not that important to the party when compared with
other problems facing the country, such as a stable and well-balanced government.
Ennahda wanted to avoid contradicting its preelection platform as well as to signal its
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Therefore, the case for or against the introduction of a shari’a clause in
the constitution should be made on normative and prudential grounds,
rather than through an abstract conceptual debate. I provide here a very
brief sketch of some of these grounds and will leave an elaborate discus-
sion to another occasion.140
There are two primary arguments supporting a shari’a clause: a norma-
tive one and a realist one. The first is a normative endorsement of the
reconciliation between shari’a and rights as an ideal compromise: on the
one hand, constitutions should reflect popular sentiment and the people’s
identity which prefers shari’a; on the other hand, liberal rights like equal-
ity and freedom of conscience are required to limit majorities’ power.
Meanwhile, the realist position maintains that this combination is unfor-
tunate or undesirable but nevertheless dictated by historical circum-
stances. For the realist this is not a bad deal because it makes the
Islamists accept some core liberal values and because shari’a itself is
manipulable and indeterminate. So the risks might not materialize.
However these arguments fail. Consider their underlying assumptions:
First, whether the people in Egypt or in Tunisia want an Islamic constitu-
tion is not that evident. It depends on how one detects the popular will.
Each method is contestable, including the electoral process. Neither the
recent parliamentary and presidential elections in Egypt and Tunisia, nor
public opinion surveys, clearly convey a popular sentiment in favor of the
shari’a clause. And even if that popular will were detected, why should
one prioritize the synchronic over the diachronic perspective? And even
if we choose the synchronic – that is, what people want now and over the
short term – that would not necessarily mean that the constitution is
either normatively legitimate or will be stable over time given this choice.
Second, whether and how the constitution should embody people’s
identity, are also contestable questions. On the one hand, an alternative
conception of the constitution would perceive it as a method of govern-
ance and procedural resolution of value conflicts. On the other hand, the
identity that the constitution is supposed to reflect can be a strictly paro-
chial identity or one perceived in relatively more universalistic terms. In
addition, there is no necessity in reflecting this identity in a shari’a clause,
as it can be reflected in a preamble, or in non-judicially enforceable direc-
tive principles.
determination to adopt the constitution by consensus—and the shari’a issue had
emerged as a red line for the secular parties. And it wanted to demonstrate to the
world that including a reference to shari’a is not necessary for establishing a
democracy that is compatible with Islam.” Duncan Pickard, The Current Status of
Constitution Making in Tunisia, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT (Apr. 19, 2012), http://
carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/current-status-of-constitution-making-in-tunisia.
140 Nimer Sultany, The Pragmatic Case Against the Sharia Clause in Post-
Authoritarian Egypt and Tunisia (on file with author).
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Third, the realist claims that the indeterminacy of shari’a belittles the
risks of its constitutionalization. Indeed, the Egyptian court—as we saw
above—virtually emptied the shari’a clause from its possible illiberal
implications. However, this interpretive indeterminacy can go either way
because the court could be packed with conservative judges and thus
depends on who gets to pick the interpreters. In addition, the argument
counts on constitutional courts to liberalize societies, but the courts’
effect in society may be limited.  Moreover,  such an argument ignores
the effect of religion in private law, like personal status, and criminal
laws, including blasphemy.
Fourth, the realist can argue that transparency in the legal order is pref-
erable because secular discourse is also manipulable. Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court, despite the Establishment Clause, allowed Sunday
laws,141 opening legislative sessions with prayer,142 the public display of
Christmas symbols,143 and governmental subsidy to religious institu-
tions.144 However, the question is not merely one of increasing trans-
parency, but also one of effectively increasing religious influence. A
regime in which shari’a is constitutionalized changes the bargaining
power of different groups within the political system. Today’s choices are
likely to influence future outcomes.
If I am correct that these four assumptions should be rejected, the nor-
mative and realist arguments that rely on them must fail. Additionally,
there are at least three positive arguments against the inclusion of a
shari’a clause.
First, considerations of pluralism and religious equality: ten percent of
Egypt’s citizens are non-Muslims, and 2% of Tunisia’s population is
either Christian or Jewish. In both states there is a strong secular base.
On both an expressive and substantive level, a shari’a clause means  that
the state does not stand from the religious groups at the same distance.
The clause is likely to influence the distribution of rights and resources
against the backdrop of a sectarian code that does not appeal to all citi-
zens. The counter-majoritarianism of this clause does not limit majority’s
power to protect an insular and discrete minority, but rather effectively
entrenches the interests of a religiously defined majority. It rigs the rules
of the political game in their favor.
Second, the entrenchment of a shari’a clause is likely to have a polariz-
ing and destabilizing effect. The cases of Egypt and Tunisia show the
polarizing potential of this question. When the shari’a clause was enacted
in Egypt in 1971 the Coptic Church vehemently opposed it and the gov-
141 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
142 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
143 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
144 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011);
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002).
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ernment placed the Patriarch under house arrest. The imposition of a
religious language on constitutional debates makes them more intractable
and a shari’a clause  will easily become an instrument of de-legitimiza-
tion, as was the case in the constitutional amendments in Egypt in March
2011. Furthermore, judicial enforcement of the clause is likely to produce
a backlash, as shown by the history of the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, in
these highly contentious issues, the constitution should be a mechanism
for managing polarization rather than being part of the problem.
Third, a shari’a clause is likely to have bad consequences: (1) the domi-
nance of the religious divide and rhetoric marginalizes other questions
and may lead to prioritizing religious concerns over other political and
socio-economic issues; (2) it is anti-democratic because it offends both
the majoritarian and constitutional conceptions of democracy; (3) it is a
form of secular escapism because secularists who are delegating these
questions to judicial elites seem unwilling or unable to make the neces-
sary effort to advance their ideas which are often divorced from concep-
tions of distributive justice; finally, (4) it is a de-politicization of
essentially political questions by legalizing them and fetishizing constitu-
tionalism – but that neither reduces their intractability nor resolves them.
To conclude, if my arguments are accepted, then a shari’a clause should
not be part of the emerging post-authoritarian constitutional order in
Egypt or Tunisia. The fact that the Tunisian constituent assembly has
apparently chosen not to include a shari’a clause is a promising sign that
indicates that this choice is politically feasible and not a predetermined
fate.
I do not consider my arguments as less controversial than the ones I
reject. Nor do I think the debate will be less intractable if held on the
more concrete level. But if there is a debate to be had on these questions,
it is more fruitful to have it on the ground level rather than the abstract
level. This call for a situated, descriptively thick, concrete examination
avoids the generalizing tendency of conceptual debates, avoids the
unwarranted optimism of the normative argument, and avoids the real-
ist’s uncritical acceptance of reality. It does not avoid a principled posi-
tion; it is clear that my arguments contribute to the liberal secular
position without falling into its flaws.
